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 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1 
Amici curiae are a group of philosophically and 
politically diverse law school professors and scholars 
in the fields of criminal law and mental health from a 
variety of disciplines who have been teaching and 
writing about the insanity defense and related issues 
throughout their careers.  They include the authors of 
leading criminal law and mental health law treatises 
and casebooks and numerous important scholarly 
books and articles. 
Amici believe this case raises important questions 
about principles of criminal responsibility, the integral 
role of the insanity defense in Anglo-American law, 
and the inadequacy of the “mens rea alternative” to the 
traditional affirmative defense.  Their teaching and 
research on the subject have given them a unique 
appreciation of the historical and doctrinal signifi-
cance of the defense of legal insanity. 
A complete list of amici who reviewed and join in 
this brief is included in the attached Appendix. 
Amici file this brief solely as individuals and not on 
behalf of any institution with which they are affiliated.  
Affiliations are provided solely for the purpose of 
identification.   
 
 
                                                            
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund its preparation or submission.  No person other 
than amici made a monetary contribution to the preparation or 
submission of this brief.  The parties were given timely notice and 
have consented to this filing. 
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BACKGROUND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The affirmative defense of legal insanity has such a 
strong historical, legal, moral and practical pedigree 
and is so widely accepted that providing such a defense 
is a matter of fundamental fairness in a just society.  
Jurisdictions have substantial leeway in deciding 
what test best meets their legal and moral policies, but 
some form of affirmative defense is a prerequisite  
of justice and therefore is required under the Due 
Process clause. 
Legal insanity gives doctrinal expression to funda-
mental legal and moral principles that have been 
recognized by the common law and statute for centu-
ries and that this Court has repeatedly acknowledged.  
Punishment under the penal law is not justified unless 
an offender can fairly be held criminally responsible 
for his conduct.  There is no dispute that severe mental 
disorder can strongly affect an individual’s cognitive 
and self-regulation capacities and that in extreme 
cases, the defects are sufficiently grave to negate any 
attribution of fault because such offenders do not 
know, understand or appreciate the wrongfulness of 
their actions.  Criminal blame and punishment are 
fundamentally unfair because such offenders are not 
responsible for their criminal conduct.  Aside from four 
states in our country, some form of the insanity 
defense is universal in United States law, as well as in 
every other jurisdiction in the common law world.   
The alternative to the insanity defense at issue in 
this case, which permits evidence of mental abnormal-
ity to be introduced to negate the mens rea for the 
crime charged, is insufficient to achieve the goal of 
responding justly to severely mentally disordered 
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offenders.  In most cases, mental disorder, including 
severe mental disorder, does not negate mens rea.  
Instead, the offender’s disordered cognition gives the 
offender the reason to form the mens rea required by 
the definition of the offense.  Although an offender 
may act for reasons entirely detached from reality 
through no fault of his own, the offender will almost 
always be exposed to conviction of the most serious 
crime charged.  These are profoundly unjust results. 
Because Kansas has abolished the defense of 
insanity, the defendant had no opportunity for a 
factual determination regarding the severity of his 
mental disorder and its impact on his ability to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of his behavior.  Accordingly, 
this Court should reverse the conviction and remand 
the case to the Supreme Court of Kansas to take 
appropriate action to reinstate the insanity defense. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LEGAL 
INSANITY EXPRESSES FUNDAMENTAL 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES LONG RECOG-
NIZED BY THE COMMON LAW, STATE 
AND FEDERAL STATUTES AND THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THIS COURT 
This section provides the positive argument in favor 
of providing an insanity defense.  It then considers the 
leeway of jurisdictions to establish a test for legal 
insanity that comports with the justice goals of 
individual jurisdictions. 
A. The Legal and Moral Necessity of the 
Insanity Defense 
It is a fundamental principle of justice that if an 
offender was not responsible for his crime, blame and 
4 
punishment under the penal law are fundamentally 
unfair and thus a violation of Due Process.  The 
affirmative defense of legal insanity applies this 
fundamental principle by excusing those mentally 
disordered offenders whose disorder or intellectual 
disability deprived them of rational understanding of 
their conduct or, in a minority of states, by excusing 
offenders whose capacity to control their conduct at 
the time of the crime was profoundly and severely 
impaired.  Michael S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1984); Herbert Fingarette  
& Ann Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal 
Responsibility (Berkeley Univ. of California Press 
1979); Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and 
Criminal Law, 101 J. Crim L. & Criminology 885, 925 
(2011).  
This principle is simple but profound.  Indeed, in 
recognition of this, the insanity defense has been a 
feature of ancient law and of English law since the 
14th Century.  Thomas Maeder, Crime and Madness: 
The Origins and Evolution of the Insanity Defense 
(Harper & Row 1985); 1 Nigel Walker, Crime and 
Insanity in England (Edinburgh Univ. Press 1968); 
Brian E. Elkins, Idaho’s Repeal of the Insanity 
Defense: What Are We Trying to Prove?, 31 Idaho L. 
Rev. 151, 161 (1994).  The predominant modern test 
for legal insanity dates to the 19th Century with 
M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), but some 
form of an affirmative defense of legal insanity existed 
many centuries before that.  A small number of 
states tried to abolish the insanity defense in the 
early part of the twentieth century, but their state 
supreme courts found these attempts unconstitu-
tional.  Stephen M. LeBlanc, Comment, Cruelty to the 
Mentally Ill: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to the 
Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 
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1281, 1289 n.45 (2007).  Thus, the insanity defense 
was universal in the United States from the founding 
until the last decades of the 20th Century. Abraham 
S. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (Yale Univ. Press, 
1967); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).  Despite 
the recent deviation from this longstanding principle 
by four states, a strong consensus still supports 
retention of the insanity defense, as was thoroughly 
explained by the Supreme Court of Nevada in 2001, 
when that court held that the legislature’s effort to 
abolish the defense was a violation of due process 
under both the state and federal constitutions. Finger 
v. State, 27 P. 3d 66 (Nev. 2001).  The insanity defense 
is firmly rooted in the legal history and traditions of 
the United States. 
In both law and morals, the capacity for reason is 
the primary foundation for responsibility and compe-
tence.  The precise cognitive deficit a person must 
exhibit can of course vary from context to context.  In 
addition, many believe that the capacity to regulate 
one’s own behavior properly, to be able to control one’s 
conduct, is also a foundation for responsibility.  In the 
criminal justice system, an offender who lacks the 
capacity to understand the wrongness of his actions as 
the result of severe mental disorder—a condition that 
is not the offender’s fault—may not be convicted and 
punished.  
Under a parallel body of law in many jurisdictions, 
a defendant who is profoundly unable to regulate his 
behavior is regarded as undeserving of full blame and 
punishment and must be excused in a sufficiently 
extreme case.  Moreover, it is generally acknowledged 
that offenders in these two categories cannot be 
deterred because the rules of law and morality cannot 
adequately guide them.  Failing to excuse severely 
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impaired mentally disordered offenders is inconsistent 
with both retributive and deterrent theories of just 
punishment. 
Legally insane offenders are not excused solely 
because they suffered from a severe mental disorder at 
the time of the crime.  The mental disorder must also 
impair their ability to know, understand or appreciate 
that what they are doing is wrong or to impair some 
other functional capacity that a jurisdiction believes 
is crucial to responsibility.  The crimes of those found 
legally insane do not result from bad judgment, 
insufficient moral sense, bad attitudes, or bad charac-
ters, none of which is an excusing condition.  Rather, 
the crimes of legally insane offenders arise from a lack 
of understanding or lack of self-regulation capacity 
that is produced by severe mental abnormality and 
thus their criminal conduct is not reflective of culpable 
moral failure.  To convict such people offends the basic 
sense of justice. 
This Court has recently recognized that defects  
in the capacity for rationality and self-regulation 
preclude the most severe punishments for offenders 
with intellectual disability and juvenile offenders.  
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (intellectual 
disability); Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 (2005) 
(juveniles).  These defects exist along a continuum, 
ranging from mild to severe.  In the cases involving 
intellectual disability and youth, the offenders were 
responsible to some degree, but in cases of more severe 
intellectual disability or developmental immaturity, 
holding such offenders responsible at all offends 
widely shared views about responsibility.  The same 
principles apply to people with mental disorder.  
Although most people with mental disorder who 
commit crimes may be fully or partially responsible,  
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in cases of severe disorder, the rationality and self-
regulation defects this Court has recognized are so 
substantial that the offender is blameless and should 
not be held responsible.2 
A similar baseline principle explains the many 
competence doctrines employed in the criminal justice 
process.  This Court has long recognized that at every 
stage justice demands that some people with severe 
mental abnormalities must be treated differently from 
those without substantial mental impairment because 
some impaired defendants are incapable of reason and 
understanding in a specific context.  Competence to 
stand trial, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); 
competence to plead guilty and to waive counsel, 
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); competence to 
represent oneself, Indiana v. Edwards, 534 U.S. 164 
(2008); and competence to be executed, Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), Panetti v. Quarterman, 
551 U.S. 930 (2007), Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 
718 (2019), are all examples in which the Constitution 
requires such special treatment.  It is unfair and 
offensive to the dignity of criminal justice to treat 
people without understanding as if their understand-
ing was unimpaired.  Evidence of mental disorder is 
routinely introduced in all these contexts to determine 
if the defendant must be accorded special treatment. 
The impact of mental disorder on an offender’s 
responsibility and competence is recognized through-
out the criminal law.  Even the few jurisdictions that 
                                                            
2 Note that the affirmative defense of legal insanity is the 
traditional doctrine by which people with marked intellectual 
disability can be fully excused.  If the insanity defense were 
eliminated, most such offenders will form the requisite mens rea 
for the crime charged and will be punished despite lacking 
responsibility. 
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have abolished the insanity defense, such as Kansas, 
recognize that mental disorder affects criminal re-
sponsibility because they permit the introduction of 
evidence of mental disorder to negate the mens rea for 
the crime charged and at sentencing. State v. Kahler, 
410 P.3d 105, 124-25 (Kan. 2018).  As Part II explains, 
however, this use of mental disorder evidence does not 
honor the principles concerning responsibility that are 
so deeply rooted in our legal history and tradition.  As 
this Court has recognized, state infliction of stigma-
tization and punishment is a severe infringement, In 
re Winship, 377 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).  It is unfair to 
prevent a defendant from proving, based on routinely 
admissible evidence, that he lacked rational under-
standing of his conduct, even if he formed the charged 
mens rea.  That is precisely the issue Kahler raises.   
Historical practice, the near universal acceptance of 
the need for an independent affirmative defense of 
legal insanity, and the fundamental unfairness of 
blaming and punishing legally insane offenders pro-
vide the strongest reasons to conclude that funda-
mental fairness and the Due Process clause require an 
insanity defense.  Abolishing this narrowly defined 
and deeply rooted defense could plausibly be justified 
only if an alternative legal approach could reach the 
same just result or if irremediably deep flaws preclude 
fair and accurate administration of the defense.  
The next two main sections of this brief argue that 
there are no such alternatives and that the defense is 
no more vulnerable to risks of mistake and abuse than 
any other disputed issue in the penal law. 
B. The Test for Legal Insanity 
This brief takes no position about what test for the 
affirmative defense of legal insanity any jurisdiction 
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should adopt as long as the jurisdiction’s rule permits 
defendants to raise defects resulting from severe 
impairments caused by mental disorder or intellectual 
disability that compromise the defendant’s understand- 
ing of the wrongfulness of his criminal actions despite 
the presence of the mens rea required by the definition 
of the offense.  This is as it should be.  As Justice 
Marshall’s plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas said,  
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long 
evolution of the collection of interlocking and 
overlapping concepts which the common law 
has utilized to assess the moral accountabil-
ity of an individual for his antisocial deeds.  
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insan-
ity, mistake, justification, and duress have 
historically provided the tools for a constantly 
shifting adjustment of the tension between 
the evolving aims of the criminal law 
and changing religious, moral, philosophical, 
and medical views of the nature of man.  This 
process of adjustment has always been 
thought to be the province of the States.  
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (emphasis 
added). 
Jurisdictions in our federal system have consider-
able constitutional leeway to decide what types of 
disorders and their consequent impairments are 
necessary to warrant a full legal excuse and what 
procedures should govern insanity defense cases.  
Indeed, in Clark, 548 U.S. 735, at 753-56, this Court 
approved Arizona’s test for legal insanity, the nation’s 
most limited rule.  
Discussion in this brief has focused on lack of  
the capacity to know, appreciate or understand the 
wrongfulness of one’s actions or to regulate one’s 
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behavior because, in one form or another, these 
deficits best explain the predominant tests adopted by 
forty-six states (including Arizona) and the federal 
criminal code.3  But how such lack of understanding 
or self-regulation should be defined doctrinally are 
matters within the province of the states and the 
federal government.  Nevertheless, stigmatizing and 
punishing all severely disordered offenders, even 
those who were grossly out of touch with reality or 
seriously unable to regulate their conduct at the time 
of the crime is unjust.  Such an offender is not a 
responsible agent, is not at fault, and only some 
defense of legal insanity can appropriately respond to 
this moral truth that has been recognized in law for 
centuries.   
The Court should rule that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits criminal conviction and punishment of an 
offender who, as a result of mental disorder at the time 
                                                            
3 All states that recognize the insanity defense have a “test” 
that is grounded in M’Naghten – (.i.e., that the defendant is not 
criminally responsible if he was unable to “know” the nature  
and quality of his conduct or unable to “know” that it was wrong).  
Much of the case law relates to the meaning of “knowing” that the 
act was “wrong.”  The meaning of this phrase was a major 
consideration in the drafting of the Model Penal Code insanity 
test, which states that a person is not criminally responsible if he 
lacked “substantial capacity” to “appreciate” the wrongfulness of 
the conduct.  The MPC drafters omitted the “nature and quality 
of the act” part of M’Naghten because they regarded it as 
superfluous.  The term “appreciation” was used to embrace the 
“affective” dimension of psychotic illness.  It is designed to avoid 
conviction of a delusional defendant who was so detached from 
reality that he was unable to recognize the moral and emotional 
significance of his act.  See generally, Richard J. Bonnie, John C. 
Jeffries, Jr., and Peter W. Low, A Case Study in the Insanity 
Defense: The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr.  12-14, 18-20 (3rd. ed 
2008).  
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of the offense, did not know, appreciate or understand 
the wrongfulness of his actions (or suffered from a 
comparable cognitive defect that equally undermines 
responsibility).  Over the past century, many states 
and legal commentators have embraced the view that 
blame and punishment are also unfair in cases in 
which the offender’s capacity to regulate his behavior 
at the time of the offense was profoundly severely 
impaired.  Nevertheless, this view has never attracted 
an equivalent level of legislative and judicial support, 
and the court should, accordingly, leave the decision 
whether to recognize a defense in such cases to the 
individual states. 
II. ADMITTING MENTAL DISORDER EVI-
DENCE TO NEGATE MENS REA OR  
TO MITIGATE THE SENTENCE ARE 
INADEQUATE SUBSTITUTES FOR THE 
INSANITY DEFENSE 
This section first addresses then “mens rea alterna-
tive” and then considers sentencing. 
A. The Mens Rea Alternative 
The negation of mens rea and the affirmative 
defense of legal insanity are different claims that 
preclude criminal liability by different means.  The 
former denies the prima facie case of the particular 
crime charged; the latter is an affirmative defense  
that precludes liability in those cases in which the 
prima facie case is established.  The post-verdict 
consequences are also different.  The former leads to 
outright acquittal; the latter results in some form of 
involuntary civil commitment.  Although in some 
cases the same mental disorder evidence may be used 
to prove the two different claims, they are not 
equivalent. 
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The primary reason that permitting a defendant to 
introduce evidence of mental disorder to negate mens 
rea cannot justly replace the affirmative defense of 
legal insanity is that the mens rea alternative is based 
on a mistaken view of how severe mental disorder 
affects human behavior.  In virtually all cases, mental 
disorder, even severe disorders marked by psychotic 
symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations, does 
not negate mens rea.  Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished 
Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 1, 16 (1984); Morse, Mental, supra, at 
933.  It is difficult to prove a negative, but cases, 
especially those involving serious crime, in which most 
or all mens rea is negated are rare to the vanishing 
point.  Rather, mental disorder affects a person’s 
motivations or reasons for committing the criminal 
acts.  A mentally disordered defendant’s irrationally 
distorted beliefs, perceptions or desires typically and 
paradoxically give him the motivation to form the 
mens rea required by the charged offense.  Mental 
disorder rarely interferes with the ability to perform 
the necessary actions to achieve irrationally motivated 
aims.  In cases of self-regulation problems, the defend-
ant does form the mens rea but lacks substantial 
capacity to conform his conduct to the law. 
Consider the following, typical examples, beginning 
with Daniel M’Naghten himself.  M’Naghten’s Case, 8 
Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); M’Naghten delusionally believed 
that the ruling Tory party was persecuting and 
intended to kill him.  Richard Moran, Knowing  
Right From Wrong: The Insanity Defense Of Daniel 
McNaughtan 10 (2000).  As a result, he formed the 
belief that he needed to assassinate the Prime 
Minister, Peel, in order to end the threat.  He therefore 
formed the intention to kill Peel.  Thus, M’Naghten 
would have been convicted of murder if a defense of 
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legal insanity was not available.  Indeed, his case has 
come to stand for one of the “rules” enunciated by the 
House of Lords – that a defendant should be acquitted 
on grounds of insanity if he “was laboring under such 
a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not 
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, 
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing 
what was wrong.” 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.  
For a more contemporary example, consider the case 
of Ms. Andrea Yates, the Texas woman who drowned 
her five children in a bathtub.  She delusionally 
believed that she was corrupting her children and that 
unless she killed them, they would be tortured in Hell 
for all eternity. Deborah W. Denno, Who is Andrea 
Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 Duke J. 
Gender L. & Pol’y 1 (2003).  She therefore formed  
the intention to kill them.  Indeed, she planned 
the homicides carefully.  Ms. Yates was nonetheless 
acquitted by reason of insanity because she did not 
know that what she was doing was wrong.  Even if she 
cognitively recognized that her conduct violated the 
law of Texas and that she would be arrested, she was 
deeply convinced that the homicides were necessary to 
assure the eternal well-being of her children under the 
circumstances.  In her psychotic thinking, everyone 
else would approve of her conduct as justified if they 
knew what she knew.  
For a final example, suppose an offender halluci-
nates that he is hearing God’s voice or delusionally 
believes that God is communicating with him and that 
God is commanding him to kill.  E.g., People v. Serravo, 
823 P. 2d 828, 830 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).  If the 
offender kills in response to this “command hallucina-
tion” or delusion, he surely forms the intent to kill to 
obey the divine decree.  Nonetheless, it would be 
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unjust to punish this defendant because he, too, does 
not know right from wrong given his beliefs for which 
he is not responsible.   
In all three cases, one could also claim that the 
defendant did not know what he or she was doing in a 
fundamental sense because the most material reason 
for action, what motivated them to form mens rea, was 
based on a delusion or hallucination that was the 
irrational product of a disordered mind.  Finally, in all 
three cases the defendant’s instrumental rationality, 
the ability rationally to achieve one’s ends, was 
intact despite their severe disorders.  They were able 
effectively to carry out their disordered plans. 
There are very few contemporary data about the 
operation of the insanity defense and virtually none 
about the operation of the mens rea alternative.  
Montana is the only state for which there is a 
systematic study of mental disorder claims pre- and 
post-abolition of the insanity defense.  The picture is 
complicated, but in brief, the number of cases, the 
types of defendants and the types of crimes did not 
change.  There were two major effects, however.  
Under the mens rea alternative, more defendants 
were convicted and the number of defendants found 
incompetent to stand trial increased markedly.  Lisa 
Callahan et al., The Hidden Effects of Montana’s 
“Abolition” of the Insanity Defense, 66 Psychiatric Q. 
103 (1995).  Neither change is desirable.  For the 
reasons given in Part I, supra, conviction is unjust in 
any case in which the defendant should have been 
acquitted by reason of insanity.  The increase in 
convictions in Montana demonstrates that abolition of 
the insanity defense does, in fact, expose severely 
mentally ill offenders to unjust punishment.  More-
over, the rise in the number of defendants found 
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incompetent to stand trial who would previously have 
been found competent and acquitted suggests that an 
incompetency finding is being used as a tool for 
diversion in cases involving less serious charges 
that likely would have led to stipulated insanity 
acquittals under the pre-abolition statute.  This is also 
objectionable.  
Although Kahler seemed to have had the mens rea 
required for the charged offense of capital murder, his 
expert evidence established that he suffered from a 
number of mental disorders, including a major mental 
disorder, severe depression.  As a result, the expert 
opined, Kahler’s perception and judgment were so 
distorted that he may have become dissociated from 
reality at the time of the crime.  The expert also 
testified that Kahler could not refrain from his 
conduct.  Because an insanity defense was not avail-
able and Kahler’s conduct met the criteria for capital 
murder, his conviction for the most serious crime  
in the criminal law was improperly a foregone 
conclusion. 
To further understand the injustice of the mens rea 
alternative, consider a case in which mens rea may 
plausibly be negated.  Suppose a defendant charged 
with murder claims that he delusionally believed that 
his obviously human victim of a shooting was in reality 
the devil and not a human being.  See Richard J. 
Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense,  
69 A.B.A. J. 194, 195-96 (1983).  If his beliefs were 
genuine, the defendant did not intentionally kill a 
human being.  Indeed, in a mens rea alternative 
jurisdiction, he could not be convicted of purposely, 
knowingly or recklessly killing a human being because 
his delusional beliefs negated all three mental states.  
After all, he fully believed that he was shooting at the 
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devil, not a human being.  The defendant would be 
convicted of negligent homicide, however, because the 
standard for negligence is objective reasonableness 
and the motivating belief was patently unreasonable.   
Of course, convicting the severely disordered 
defendant of a crime based on a negligence standard is 
fundamentally unjust, as even Mr. Justice Holmes 
recognized in his rightly famous essays on the common 
law.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 
50-51 (Little, Brown & Co. 1945) (1881).  The defend-
ant’s unreasonable mistake was not an ordinary 
mistake caused by inattention, carelessness or the 
like.  Defendants are responsible for the latter because 
we believe that they had the capacity to behave more 
reasonably by being more careful or attentive.  In 
contrast, the hypothetical defendant’s delusional 
“mistake” was the product of a disordered mind and 
thus he had no insight and no ability to recognize the 
gross distortion of reality.  He was a victim of his 
disorder, not someone who deserves blame and pun-
ishment as a careless perpetrator of involuntary 
manslaughter.  He does not deserve any blame and 
punishment, and only the defense of legal insanity 
could achieve this appropriate result.  Paradoxically, 
such a defendant’s potential future dangerousness if 
he remains deluded would be better addressed by an 
insanity acquittal and indefinite involuntary commit-
ment, a practice this Court has approved, Jones v. 
U.S., 463 U.S. 354 (1983), than by the comparatively 
short, determinate sentences for involuntary man-
slaughter. 
Thus, the mens rea alternative is not an acceptable 
replacement or substitute for the insanity defense.  
Only in the exceedingly rare case in which mental 
disorder negates all mens rea would the equivalent 
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justice of a full acquittal be achieved, albeit for a 
different reason.  But again, this is the rarest of cases.  
Most legally insane offenders form the mens rea 
required by the definition of the charged offense and 
only the defense of legal insanity can respond justly to 
their lack of blameworthiness.   
B. Sentencing 
Consideration of mental disorder for purposes of 
assessing both mitigation and aggravation is a staple 
of both capital and non-capital sentencing, but it is no 
substitute for the affirmative defense of legal insanity.  
On moral grounds, it is unfair to blame and punish a 
defendant who deserves no blame and punishment at 
all, even if the offender’s sentence is reduced.  Blaming 
and punishing in such cases is unjust, full stop.  
Sentencing judges might also use mental disorder as 
an aggravating consideration because it might suggest 
that the defendant is especially dangerous as a result.  
Thus, sentences of severely mentally ill offenders 
might be enhanced.  Again, injustice would result, and 
indeterminate post-acquittal comment would better 
protect public safety than enhanced sentences.  Third, 
unless a sentencing judge is required by law to 
consider mental disorder at sentencing, whether the 
judge does so will be entirely discretionary.  Again, 
this is a potent, potential source of injustice.  In short, 
only a required insanity defense would insure that 
arguably blameless mentally disordered offenders 
have an opportunity to establish that state blame and 
punishment are not justified. 
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III. THE OBJECTIONS TO THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE ARE TOO INSUBSTANTIAL 
TO JUSTIFY ABOLITION  
A number of objections to the insanity defense have 
been raised by proponents of abolition, including 
Kansas, but they are insubstantial and provide not 
even a rational basis for abolishing a defense with 
such a profound historical, legal, and moral basis.  See 
Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity 
Defense in Kansas, 8 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 253, 255-
60 (1998).  They certainly cannot survive a more 
demanding standard of review.  In general, these 
objections relate to supposed difficulties of administer-
ing the insanity defense fairly and accurately.  Specific 
objections include:  (A) administering the defense 
requires an assessment of the defendant’s past mental 
state using controversial psychiatric and psychological 
evidence, a task that is too difficult; (B) acquitting 
insane defendants endangers public safety; (C) the 
indeterminacy of the defense produces arbitrary  
verdicts; and (D) it invites fraudulent claims by 
defendants trying  to “beat the rap.” 
A. Assessing Past Mental State Using 
Psychological and Psychiatric 
Evidence 
It is often difficult to reconstruct past mental states 
and, as this Court has acknowledged, psychological 
and psychiatric evidence can be problematic.  Clark, 
548 U.S. at 740-41; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 
(2002).  Nevertheless, all jurisdictions, including mens 
rea alternative jurisdictions, concede the necessity of 
proving mens rea (for most crimes) before punishment 
may justly be imposed.  Consequently, the argument 
against the insanity defense based on the difficulty of 
reconstructing past mental states must fail unless 
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assessing past intent, knowledge, and other types  
of mens rea is easier than assessing whether the 
defendant was acting under the influence of severely 
abnormal mental states.  After all, both mens rea and 
legal insanity refer to past mental states that must  
be inferred from the defendant’s actions, including 
utterances.  The severe disorder that is practically 
necessary to support an insanity defense is arguably 
easier to prove than ordinary mens rea.  
Despite the problems with mental health evidence, 
all but four jurisdictions that have abolished the 
insanity defense believe that assessing legal insanity 
at the time of the crime with mental health evidence 
is possible.  Indeed, it is routine.  Moreover, even the 
four abolitionist jurisdictions permit introduction of 
such evidence to negate mens rea.  Unless abolitionist 
jurisdictions are prepared to argue—and none has—
that assessing mens rea with mental health evidence 
is uniquely reliable, the argument based on the 
deficiencies of mental health evidence lacks credi-
bility.  Finally, mental health evidence is routinely 
admitted in a vast array of civil and criminal contexts, 
including all the criminal competencies and 
sentencing.  
B. Public Safety 
As previously argued, the insanity defense poses no 
danger to public safety.  Successful insanity defenses 
are so rare that deterrence will not be undermined 
because few legally sane defendants will believe that 
they can avoid conviction by manipulatively and 
falsely raising the defense.  More important, every 
jurisdiction provides for commitment to a secure 
mental facility after a defendant has been acquitted by 
reason of insanity and this Court has approved 
the constitutionality of indefinite confinement (with 
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periodic review) of such acquittees as long as they 
remain mentally disordered and dangerous.  Jones, 
463 U.S. 354; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); 
Morse, Mental, supra, at 932.  Further, this Court has 
approved procedures for the commitments that are 
more likely to result in continued confinement of 
acquittees than standard civil commitment.  Jones, 
463 U.S. 354.  It is of course true that acquittees might 
be released earlier than if they had been convicted and 
imprisoned, but there is no evidence that released 
acquittees pose a special danger to the community.  
Michael K. Spodak et al., Criminality of Discharged 
Insanity Acquittees: Fifteen Year Experience in 
Maryland Reviewed, 12 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 
373, 382 (1984); Mark R. Wiederanders et al., Forensic 
Conditional Release Programs and Outcomes in Three 
States, 20 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 249, 249-257 (1997); 
Lisa A. Callahan et al., Revocation of Conditional 
Release: A Comparison of Individual and Program 
Characteristics across Four States, 21 Int’l J.L. & 
Psychiatry 177 (1998); George F. Parker, Outcomes of 
Assertive Community Treatment in an NGRI Condi-
tional Release Program, 32 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & 
L. 291, 291-303 (2004); Henry J. Steadman et al., 
Factors Associated With a Successful Insanity Plea, 
140 Am.J. Psychiatry 401, 402-03 (1983).   
C. Indeterminacy of the Insanity Tests 
Unlike many other criteria for criminal liability, the 
insanity defense tests do not raise strictly factual 
questions.  Rather, the judgment made about the 
defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime is 
primarily a legal, moral, and social judgment.  For 
example, whether the defendant fired the fatal bullet 
and intended to kill the victim, thus satisfying 
the elements of murder, are factual questions with 
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determinate, albeit often difficult to determine, 
answers.  By contrast, the insanity defense tests ask 
indeterminate questions, such as how much under-
standing of right and wrong a defendant must have in 
order to be acquitted (or, in the minority of states that 
also have a control test, how substantially their 
capacity to control their conduct was impaired).  Of 
course, the legal judgment must be based on facts, but 
the legal test is normative and not factual.  The 
insanity defense tests prescribe the relevant behav-
ioral continuum, but drawing the line between guilt 
and innocence is the task of the finder of fact as the 
legal and moral representative of the community.  
Except at the extremes, there are rarely determinate 
answers to such questions.  Although decisions about 
normative criteria can be difficult, decisions about 
legal insanity are no more challenging (and probably 
more determinate) than judgments about reasonable-
ness or recklessness that finders of fact routinely 
make. 
D. Fraudulent Claims  
Few defendants who are actually legally sane in 
some objective sense “beat the rap” with the insanity 
defense.  Experts using the proper diagnostic tools can 
reliably distinguish people who are faking major 
mental disorder.  Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline 
Which Separated You from Me”: The Insanity Defense, 
the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the 
Culture of Punishment, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1375, 1409-16 
(1997)  Further, it is best estimated that the insanity 
defense is raised in less than one percent of federal and 
state trials and is rarely successful.  Nat’l Mental 
Health Ass’n, Myths and Realities: A Report of the 
Nat’l Comm’n on the Insanity Defense 14-15 (1983); 
Richard A. Pasewark, Insanity Pleas: A Review of the 
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Research Literature, 9 J. Psychiatry & Law 357, 361-
66 (1981).  
The complaint that the availability of the defense of 
legal insanity allows large numbers of guilty criminals 
to avoid conviction and punishment is simply 
unfounded.  Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike 
generally recognize that insanity is a defense of last 
resort that betokens an otherwise weak defense and 
that rarely succeeds.  Insanity acquittals are far too 
infrequent to communicate the message that the 
criminal justice system is “soft” or fails to protect 
society.  It is impossible to measure precisely the 
symbolic value of these acquittals, but it is also hard 
to believe that they have much impact on social or 
individual perceptions.  So few insanity pleas succeed 
that neither aspiring criminals nor society assume 
that conviction and punishment will be averted by 
raising the defense.   
And, of course, if the defendant is legally insane and 
succeeds with the defense, he deserves to be acquitted 
and has not “beaten the rap” at all.   
The “tough on crime” justification that underlies 
this argument is based on a fundamental misconcep-
tion about the meaning of an insanity acquittal.  In 
cases of a successful insanity defense, the prima facie 
case for guilt has been established and the verdict thus 
announces that the defendant’s conduct was wrong.  
Nonetheless, the defendant did not deserve blame and 
punishment and will be confined by commitment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Until the latter part of the Twentieth Century, all 
American jurisdictions had some version of the 
insanity defense.  Even now, only four states have 
abolished the defense.  The historical practice and 
continuing consensus favoring retention of the defense 
reflect a longstanding legal and moral judgment that 
it is unfair and unjust to blame and punish criminal 
defendants who lacked the capacity to understand  
or appreciate the wrongness of their actions.  This 
proposition is so rooted in our legal and moral tradi-
tions and culture that this Court should recognize its 
constitutional status.  Further, there is no alternative 
that will achieve equal justice by other means.  
Finally, the policy reasons that might override the 
fairness concerns are insufficient.  Accordingly, we 
urge the Court to rule that the insanity defense is so 
deeply rooted in our nation’s legal traditions and is so 
fundamental to justice that it may not be abolished.  
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List of Amici Curiae 
John Felipe Acevedo is Visiting Lecturer of Law at the 
University of Alabama Culverhouse School of Law. He 
writes about criminal justice. 
Akin Adepoju is Adjunct Professor at Widener 
University Delaware Law School, where he teaches 
courses in advanced criminal law and Eighth 
Amendment, and studies and practices extensively in 
the area of law and mental health. 
Janet Ainsworth is John D. Eshelman Professor of 
Law at Seattle University, where she teaches criminal 
procedure and criminal law. 
Lawrence Alexander is Warren Distinguished Professor 
of Law and Co-Executive Director of the Institute for 
Law & Religion at the University of San Diego School 
of Law. He has written numerous books and articles 
on criminal law and philosophy. 
Jose’ Felipe’ Anderson is Professor of Law at the 
University of Baltimore School of Law. He was an 
appellate public defender (Supervising Attorney) in 
Maryland who routinely addressed mental state issues 
and he now teaches criminal law and procedure. 
Peter Arenella is Professor of Law Emeritus at UCLA 
Law School. He taught criminal law, criminal 
procedure, and testified before Congress concerning 
proposed legislation to either abolish or contract the 
scope of the insanity defense in federal jurisdictions. 
Jennifer Arlen is Norma Z. Paige Professor of Law at 
New York University School of Law. She teaches in the 
criminal area and has expertise in the psychology of 
responsibility. 
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Robert Aronson is Betts, Patterson Professor of Law 
Emeritus at the University of Washington. He has 
taught criminal law, evidence and professional 
responsibility. 
Hadar Aviram is Thomas Miller ‘73 Professor of Law 
at UC Hastings. She teaches criminal justice and civil 
rights.  
Barbara Babcock, a former defense attorney, is Crown 
Prof. Emerita, Stanford Law School, where she taught 
criminal justice. 
Cheryl G. Bader is Associate Clinical Professor of Law 
Fordham University. A former AUSA, she is currently 
teaching an interdisciplinary Criminal Defense Clinic 
that collaborates with Ph.D. candidates in Fordham’s 
Forensic Psychology program.  
W. David Ball is Associate Professor at the Santa 
Clara School of Law and Co-Chair of the Corrections 
Committee of the American Bar Association. 
Brook K. Baker is Professor of Law at Northeastern 
University School of Law. He teaches disability rights. 
Susan A. Bandes is Centennial Professor of Law 
Emeritus at DePaul University College of Law. She 
has written extensively in the fields of criminal law, 
criminal procedure, and law and psychology.  
Rachel E. Barkow is the Vice Dean and Segal Family 
Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy and the 
Faculty Director of the Center on the Administration 
of Criminal Law at NYU School of Law. 
Loftus Becker is Professor of Law Emeritus at the 
University of Connecticut School of Law. He taught 
and wrote about criminal law, constitutional law, and 
law and psychology and psychiatry from 1972 to 2018. 
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Valena Beety is Professor of Law at the Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law Arizona State University. 
She teaches criminal law, criminal procedure, post-
conviction remedies, and her scholarship focuses on 
wrongful convictions.  
Adam Benforado is Professor of Law at the Drexel 
University Kline School of Law. He teaches criminal 
law and law and mind sciences, and his research is 
focused on law and psychology. 
Michael J. Benza is Senior Instructor of Law at Case 
Western Reserve University, School of Law. He 
teaches criminal law and constitutional criminal 
procedure with special focus on the death penalty and 
prisoners’ rights, and has represented death row 
inmates for over 20 years. 
Vera Bergelson is Professor of Law and Robert E. 
Knowlton Scholar at Rutgers School of Law-Newark. 
She writes extensively about criminal law. 
Mitchell Berman is the Leon Meltzer Professor of Law, 
and Professor of Philosophy, at the University of 
Pennsylvania. He teaches and writes in criminal law 
and constitutional law. 
William W. Berry III is Associate Professor of Law at 
the University of Mississippi School of Law. He 
teaches criminal law, is a co-author of a criminal law 
textbook (Criminal Law, Carolina Academic Press, 9th 
edition), and has written extensively about the death 
penalty and the Eighth Amendment. 
Donald N. Bersoff is Professor of Law Emeritus at 
Drexel Law School, where he taught mental health 
law. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the 
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law. 
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Guyora Binder is SUNY Distinguished Professor of 
Law and Vice Dean for Research at the University at 
Buffalo School of Law, SUNY. He is author of The 
Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Criminal Law, and 
many works on culpability, punishment theory, and 
homicide law. 
Christopher Blakesley is Professor Emeritus at 
Louisiana State University and at the University of 
Nevada Las Vegas, where he is also a Barrick 
Distinguished Scholar. 
John H. Blume is the Samuel F. Leibowitz Professor of 
Trial Techniques at Cornell Law School where he 
teaches criminal procedure, evidence and federal 
appellate practice. Most of his scholarship explores 
issues related to intellectual disability, mental illness 
and impairment and capital punishment.  
Susanna L. Blumenthal is William Prosser Professor 
of Law and Professor of History at the University of 
Minnesota. She teaches criminal law and has written 
extensively about the history of criminal responsibility 
and medico-legal conceptions of insanity. 
Ted Blumoff is Professor of Law at Mercer University 
School of Law. He writes extensively on mental 
disorder and criminal responsibility. 
Richard Boldt is T. Carroll Brown Professor of Law  
at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law. 
He teaches mental health law and criminal law and 
has published significant scholarship on criminal 
responsibility.  
Richard J. Bonnie is Harrison Foundation Professor  
of Law and Medicine, Professor of Psychiatry and 
Neurobehavioral Sciences, Professor of Public Policy, 
and Director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry 
and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. He is 
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coauthor of a leading casebook, Criminal Law (4th ed 
2015), and, A Case Study in the Insanity Defense: The 
Trial of JohnW. Hinckley, Jr. (3rd ed 2008). 
Vincent Martin Bonventre is the Justice Robert H. 
Jackson Distinguished Professor of Law at Albany 
Law School, Albany, NY. He teaches criminal procedure 
and constitutional law and has written and lectured 
extensively about criminal law and constitutional law 
subjects. 
Deborah L. Borman, who is also a social worker, is 
Assistant Professor of Law at the University of 
Arkansas, Little Rock. She has extensive experience as 
both an attorney and social worker with people with 
mental disorder. 
Bruce A. Boyer is Curt and Linda Rodin Professor of 
Law and Social Justice at Loyola University of Chicago 
School of Law. He is the Director of Loyola’s Civitas 
ChildLaw Clinic and his responsibilities include 
teaching criminal law. 
Shawn Boyne is Professor of Law at the Indiana 
University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. She is 
a former prosecutor who teaches criminal law and 
criminal procedure and has written extensively on 
prosecutorial decision-making. 
Frank A. Bress is Professor of Law, Director of Clinical 
Programs and Acting Director of Clinical and 
Experiential Learning at New York Law School. He 
has taught a criminal defense clinic and related 
criminal law and criminal procedure courses and has 
interposed an insanity defense in many homicide 
cases. 
Katherine S. Broderick is Dean Emerita and Joseph 
Raul Chair of Social Justice at the University of the 
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law. 
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She is former director of the criminal defense clinic for 
10 years, member of the Access to Justice Commission. 
William M. Brooks is Clinical Professor of Law at 
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. He 
teaches mental health law and has both litigated on 
behalf of and written extensively about the rights of 
people with mental illness. 
Darryl Brown is O.M. Vicars Professor of Law at the 
University of Virginia School of Law. 
John Burkoff is Professor of Law Emeritus at the 
University of Pittsburgh. He has taught courses in 
criminal law for many years in the United States and 
other countries, and has written extensively about 
criminal law and criminal responsibility.  
Catherine Greene Burnett is Associate Dean and 
Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law 
Houston. Her clinical work involves post-conviction 
remedies that often raise mental health issues. 
Catherine L. Carpenter is The Hon. Arleigh M. Woods 
and William T. Woods Professor of Law at Southwestern 
Law School. She writes extensively in the area of sex 
crimes and sex offense registration laws. 
Jenny Carroll is the Wiggins, Childs, Quinn, and 
Pantazis Professor of Law at the Culverhouse School 
of Law, University of Alabama. She teaches criminal 
law and criminal procedure and has written exten-
sively about calculation of criminal culpability 
Linda Carter is Professor of Law Emerita at the 
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. She 
taught criminal law and criminal procedure for over 30 
years and also published on criminal procedure issues. 
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Timothy Casey is Professor in Residence and Director 
of the STEPPS Program at California Western School 
of Law. He teaches and writes about legal ethics, and 
criminal law and procedure. 
Rosanna Cavallaro is Professor of Law at Suffolk 
University Law School. She teaches and writes about 
criminal law. 
Carol A. Chase is Professor Emerita at Pepperdine 
Law School where she taught criminal law, criminal 
procedure, evidence and trial practice. She is a former 
federal prosecutor. 
Kami Chavis is Professor Law and Director of the 
Criminal Justice Program at Wake Forest and a 
former AUSA in the District of Columbia. She teaches 
criminal law. 
Gabriel J. Chin is Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair and 
Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law at the 
University of California, Davis School of Law. He 
teaches and has written extensively about constitu-
tional criminal law and procedure. 
Morgan Cloud is Charles Howard Candler Professor of 
Law at Emory University School of Law. He has 
taught and written about criminal law and procedure 
for 36 years. 
John C. Coffee, Jr. is Adolf A. Berle Professor at 
Columbia Law School, where he teaches criminal law 
and white collar crime. 
James A. Cohen is Associate Professor of Law at 
Fordham University School of Law. 
Marjorie Cohn is professor emerita at Thomas 
Jefferson School of Law, where she taught criminal 
law, criminal procedure and evidence. 
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Doug Colbert is Professor of Law at the Maryland 
Francis King Carey School of Law. He has been 
teaching criminal law for 35 years. 
Dana K. Cole is Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Akron School of Law. He teaches 
criminal law, evidence, and trial advocacy. 
Kevin Cole is Professor of Law at the University of San 
Diego, where he teaches criminal law and procedure. 
He is the editor of the CrimProf Blog and has written 
on the topic of criminal responsibility and practical 
limits in litigating about it. 
Beth A. Colgan is an Assistant Professor of Law at 
UCLA School of Law, where she teaches criminal law. 
She writes about proportionality and punishment. 
Anna G. Cominsky is a Visiting Associate Professor of 
Law at New York Law School where she teaches and 
supervises the Criminal Defense Clinic. She has been 
practicing criminal defense work for 13 years.  
John Copacino is Professor of Law at Georgetown 
University Law Center. He has been the Director of 
the Criminal Justice Clinic at Georgetown for 32 years 
and has practiced criminal law for 40 years. 
Michael Louis Corrado is Arch Allen Distinguished 
Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of North 
Carolina Law School. He has written extensively on 
criminal responsibility. 
Robert J. Cottrol is Harold Paul Green Research 
Professor of Law and Professor of History and 
Sociology at The George Washington University Law 
School. He has taught criminal law for over 30 years. 
Anne M. Coughlin is Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Professor of 
Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. She 
teaches criminal law and criminal procedure, she is 
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the co-author of a criminal law casebook, and she  
has written a number of articles about criminal 
responsibility.  
Aliza Plener Cover is Associate Professor at the 
University of Idaho College of Law. She teaches and 
writes about criminal law, criminal procedure, and the 
death penalty.  
Randall Coyne is Frank Elkouri and Edna Asper 
Elkouri Professor of Law Emeritus at the University 
of Oklahoma College of Law 
Phyllis L. Crocker is Professor of Law and Dean at 
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. She has 
taught criminal law and capital punishment and the 
law and has written extensively about criminal 
culpability and deathworthiness. 
Dennis E. Curtis is Clinical Professor of Law Emeritus 
at Yale Law School. 
Joseph L. Daly is Emeritus Professor of Law at Mitchell 
Hamline School of Law. He taught criminal law and 
procedure and worked for a year during a sabbatical in 
Regions Hospital in St Paul identifying legal issues 
involved in the treatment of the mentally ill. 
Caroline Davidson is Associate Professor of Law at 
Willamette University, College of Law. She teaches 
criminal law, criminal procedure, and international 
criminal law and has written extensively about 
criminal law and human rights norms relating to 
criminal defendants. 
Angela J. Davis is Professor of Law at the American 
University Washington College of Law where she 
teaches criminal law, criminal procedure, criminal 
defense: theory and practice, and criminal justice 
ethics: prosecution and defense. She is a former 
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director of the Public Defender Service for the District 
of Columbia.  
LaJuana Davis is Professor of Law at Samford 
University, Cumberland School of Law. She teaches 
criminal law and disability law and has extensive 
experience litigating mental health claims in capital 
cases. 
Christopher Dearborn is Clinical Professor of Law at 
Suffolk University Law School. He runs a criminal 
defense clinic and teaches in the areas of trial 
advocacy, criminal Law, and evidence. 
Miguel de Figueiredo is Associate Professor of Law 
at the University of Connecticut School of Law. He 
teaches criminal law and criminal procedure. 
Nora V. Demleitner is Roy L. Steinheimer Jr. 
Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University 
School of Law. She teaches and writes about criminal 
law and sentencing issues, and is the lead author of 
Sentencing Law and Policy (4th ed., 2018 Wolters 
Kluwer) and an editor of the Federal Sentencing 
Reporter. 
Deborah W. Denno is Arthur A. McGivney Professor of 
Law and Founding Director of the Neuroscience and 
Law Center at the Fordham University School of Law. 
She teaches criminal law and criminal procedure and 
writes about various criminal law topics, including 
insanity.  
Brett Dignam is Vice Dean of Experiential Education 
and Clinical Professor of Law at Columbia University 
Law School. She has clinics at both Yale (1992-2010) 
and Columbia (2010-present) Law Schools where she 
supervised law students who represent state and 
federal prisoners in federal court, many of whom have 
raised mental health defenses. 
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J. Amy Dillard is Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Baltimore School of Law. She teaches 
criminal law and constitutional criminal procedure 
and has written extensively on competency and sanity 
issues in capital prosecutions. 
Anthony Dillof is Professor of Law at Wayne State 
University Law School. He teaches criminal law and 
has written extensively about the conditions necessary 
for just criminal liability.  
Robert D. Dinerstein is Professor of law and Director 
of the Disability Rights Law Clinic at American 
University, Washington College of Law. He teaches 
courses in and writes extensively on the rights of 
people with mental disabilities, including their 
treatment in the criminal justice system.  
Mark M Dobson is Professor of Law and the Co-
Director of the Criminal Justice Field Placement 
Clinic at the Shepard Broad College of Law of 
Nova Southeastern University. A former prosecutor, 
he teaches criminal law. 
Don Doernberg is Professor of Law Emeritus at Pace 
University Elisabeth Haub School of Law and Visiting 
Professor of Law at McGeorge Law School, University 
of the Pacific. 
Sharon Dolovich is Professor of Law and Director of 
the Prison Law and Policy Program at the UCLA 
School of Law. She has taught criminal law for almost 
20 years.  
David Dorfman is Professor of Criminal law and 
Criminal Procedure at the Elisabeth Haub School of 
Law at Pace University. He has been supervising 
attorney of the Pace Criminal Justice Clinic for the 
last seven years. 
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Joshua Dressler is Distinguished University Professor 
Emeritus at Ohio State University and the Frank R. 
Strong Chair in Law Emeritus at the Moritz College of 
Law at Ohio State University. He is the author of 
leading casebooks and treatises in criminal law and 
procedure. 
Steven Duke is a Professor of Law at Yale Law School, 
where he teaches criminal procedure. 
Martha-Grace Duncan is Professor of Law at Emory 
University School of Law, where she teaches criminal 
law and law and the unconscious mind. She has 
published extensively on criminal law, including 
works on remorse, prisons, and banishment. 
David Eagleman, a neuroscientist, is Adjunct Professor 
at Stanford in the Department of Psychiatry & 
Behavioral Sciences and is Director of the Center for 
Science and Law. He studies the intersection of brain 
science and the legal system, and has written 
extensively about criminal responsibility. 
William A. Edmundson is Regents’ Professor of Law 
and Professor of Philosophy at Georgia State 
University. He teaches criminal law and has written 
about moral and legal responsibility. 
Nancy Ehrenreich is Professor of Law at the 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law, where she 
has taught criminal law for 30 years. 
Tigran W. Eldred is Professor of Law at New England 
Law School. He teaches criminal law, criminal 
procedure, evidence and professional responsibility, 
and was formerly a public defender. 
Jules Epstein is Professor of Law and Director of 
Advocacy Programs at the Temple Beasley School of 
Law. 
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Margareth Etienne is Associate Dean and Professor  
of Law at the University of Illinois at Urbana- 
Champaign. She teaches criminal law, criminal 
procedure and sentencing law, and was formerly a 
criminal defense attorney.  
Timothy H. Everett is Clinical Professor of Law and 
Pro Bono Coordinator at the University of Connecticut 
School of Law. He has taught criminal clinics and has 
taught criminal procedure and advanced criminal 
procedure. 
Jeffrey Fagan is the Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher 
Professor of Law and Professor of Epidemiology at 
Columbia University. His research and scholarship 
examine criminal law and criminal procedure, includ-
ing research on age and criminal responsibility. 
Mary Falk is Professor of Law Emerita at Brooklyn 
Law School. 
Katherine Hunt Federle is Joseph S. Platt--Porter 
Wright Morris and Arthur Professor of Law and 
Director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Law and 
Policy Studies at the Michael E. Moritz College of Law, 
Ohio State University. 
Malcolm Feeley is Claire Sanders Clements Dean’s 
Chair Emeritus in the Jurisprudence and Social Policy 
Program of the University of California School of Law-
Berkeley. He has taught courses on courts and social 
policy and the criminal process for the past 35 years. 
Barry C. Feld is Centennial Professor of Law Emeritus 
at the University of Minnesota Law School, where he 
taught criminal procedure, criminal law and juvenile 
justice and has written extensively on adolescent 
criminal responsibility.  
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Linda C. Fentiman is Professor of Law at the Elisabeth 
Haub School of Law at Pace University. She teaches 
criminal law and mental disability law and has 
written about the insanity defense, competency to 
stand trial, criminal responsibility, and deterrence.  
Keith A. Findley is Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Wisconsin Law School. He teaches 
criminal procedure, evidence, wrongful convictions, 
and law and forensic science, and has written exten-
sively about fairness in criminal prosecutions.  
Claire O. Finkelstein is the Algernon Biddle Professor 
of Law, Professor of Philosophy and Faculty Director 
of the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School. She teaches 
criminal law and has written extensively about 
criminal law and its theory. 
George Fisher is the Judge John Crown Professor of 
Law at Stanford Law School. He is a former prosecutor 
and a longtime teacher of prosecution practice. 
Alison Flaum is Clinical Professor of Law at 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. She has 
practiced and written about criminal law for over 
twenty years, with special focus on defendants with 
compromised decisional capacity. 
Richard S. Frase is Benjamin N. Berger Professor of 
Criminal Law at the University of Minnesota Law 
School. He teaches criminal law and sentencing 
courses and has written extensively on retributive and 
other justifications for criminal punishment.  
Lance Gable is Associate Professor of Law at Wayne 
State University Law School. He teaches public health 
law/bioethics and has written extensively about 
mental health and human rights. 
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Kenneth S. Gallant is Ben J. Altheimer Distinguished 
Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of 
Arkansas at Little Rock Bowen School of Law. 
Brian R. Gallini is Senior Associate Dean for Faculty 
at the University of Arkansas School of Law. He 
teaches a variety of doctrinal criminal courses and 
writes about criminal procedure. 
Trevor Gardner is Assistant Professor of Law at the 
University of Washington. He teaches criminal Law 
and criminal procedure and has written extensively 
about the social construction of risk in relation to 
crime policy and criminal enforcement. 
Norman M. Garland is Second Century Chair in Law 
and Professor of Law at Southwestern Law School 
Brandon L. Garrett is L. Neil Williams Professor of 
Law at Duke University School of Law. His research 
and teaching interests include criminal procedure, 
wrongful convictions, habeas corpus, corporate crime, 
scientific evidence and constitutional law. 
Stephen P. Garvey is Professor of Law at Cornell Law 
School. He teaches criminal law and has written about 
the insanity defense. 
Sarah Gerwig-Moore is a Professor of Law at Mercer 
Law School. The founder of the Mercer Habeas Project, 
she teaches criminal law and procedure, and has 
written extensively about constitutional criminal law 
matters, including defenses related to mental illness 
and intellectual disability.  
Mark Godsey is Carmichael Professor at the University 
of Cincinnati College of Law. 
Phyllis Goldfarb is Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs 
and Jacob Burns Foundation Professor Emeritus of 
Clinical Law at George Washington University Law 
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School. She previously directed a Criminal Justice 
Clinic at Boston College Law School for 21 years and 
taught courses in criminal procedure and the death 
penalty. 
Sara Gordon is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs 
and an Associate Professor of Law at the William S. 
Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas, 
where she teaches evidence, criminal law, and mental 
health law. 
Stuart Green is a Distinguished Professor of Law at 
Rutgers Law School. He teaches criminal law and has 
authored numerous books and articles on criminal 
responsibility.  
Dermot Groome is Professor of Law at Penn State 
Dickinson Law. Prior to teaching criminal law and 
international criminal law, he handled several cases 
involving psychiatric defenses as both a domestic and 
international prosecutor. 
Catherine M. Grosso is Professor of Law at Michigan 
State University. She teaches and researches criminal 
procedure and capital punishment. 
Aya Gruber is Professor of Law at the University of 
Colorado Law School. She has written extensively 
about criminal law and responsibility. 
Lawrence O. Gostin is the O’Neill Chair in Global 
Health Law and Director of the World Health 
Organization Collaborating Center on National & 
Global Health Law at the Georgetown University Law 
Center. He directs the World Health Organization 
Center on National and Global Health Law. 
Thomas Hagel is Professor of Law Emeritus at the 
University of Dayton School of Law. 
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Valerie P. Hans is Charles F. Rechlin Professor of Law 
at Cornell Law School, where she teaches courses on 
law and psychology. She has conducted research and 
written about popular misconceptions of the insanity 
defense. 
Bernard E. Harcourt is Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher 
Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at 
Columbia Law School and has written extensively on 
criminal law.  
Leslie Harris is the Dorothy Kliks Fones Professor 
Emerita at the University of Oregon School of Law. 
She taught criminal law for more than 40 years. 
Brandon Hasbrouck is Assistant Professor of Law at 
Washington and Lee University School of Law. He 
teaches criminal law and his research and writing 
focuses on criminal justice reform.  
William E. Hellerstein is Professor of Law Emeritus at 
Brooklyn Law School, taught criminal procedure and 
constitutional law at Brooklyn Law School for 27 
years. He won for the Legal Aid Society of New York 
the then landmark case in which the Second Circuit 
abandoned the M’Naghten test and adopted the ALI 
Model Penal Code for criminal insanity (United States 
v. Freeman, 357 F. 2d 606 (1966)).  
Steven J. Heyman is Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent 
College of Law, Illinois Tech. He teaches criminal law 
and has written about issues of criminal law theory, 
including the legitimacy of capital punishment. 
Mark J. Heyrman is Clinical Professor of Law at the 
University of Chicago Law School. 
Janet C. Hoeffel is the Catherine D. Pierson Professor 
of Law at Tulane Law School. She teaches and writes 
18a 
in the areas of criminal law and procedure, evidence 
and death penalty law. 
Michael H. Hoffheimer is Professor of Law and Jamie 
L. Whitten Chair of Law and Government at the 
University of Mississippi. He has taught criminal law 
for over thirty years and published numerous articles 
on criminal law, legal history, and jury instructions. 
Thaddeus Hoffmeister is Professor of Criminal Law  
at the University of Dayton School of Law and a 
Lieutenant Colonel in the Trial Defense Services of the 
National Guard. 
Babe Howell is Professor of Law at CUNY School of 
Law. 
John A. Humbach is Professor of Law at Elisabeth 
Haub School of Law at Pace University. He teaches in 
the area of criminal law and writes on criminal 
responsibility. 
Heidi M. Hurd is Ross and Helen Workman Chair in 
Law, Professor of Philosophy and Co-Director of the 
Illinois Program in Law and Philosophy at the 
University of Illinois College of Law. She writes 
extensively on criminal law and moral theory. 
Douglas Husak, a lawyer and philosopher, is 
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers 
University and teaches and writes about moral and 
criminal responsibility. 
Renée McDonald Hutchins is the Dean and Joseph L. 
Rauh Jr. Chair of Public Interest Law at the 
University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke 
School of Law. She teaches criminal procedure and has 
practiced as criminal appellate attorney for more than 
25 years. 
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Chris Hutton is Professor of Law Emerita at the 
University of South Dakota School of Law. She taught 
criminal law, criminal procedure, and related subjects. 
John V. Jacobi is Dorothea Dix Professor of Health 
Law and Policy at Seton Hall Law School. He teaches 
and publishes in the areas of mental health and 
disability law.  
Eisha Jain is an Assistant Professor at the University 
of North Carolina School of Law. She teaches criminal 
law. 
Eric S. Janus is Former President and Dean and 
Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law. He 
teaches and writes in the fields of constitutional law 
and mental health law. 
Judith Johnson is Professor of Law at Mississippi 
College School of Law. She has taught criminal law 
and criminal procedure for 35 years and has been 
chairing her state committee to reform the penal code 
for 20 years. 
Sheri Lynn Johnson is James and Mark Flanagan 
Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the Cornell 
Death Penalty Project at Cornell Law School. 
Thea Johnson is an Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Maine School of Law. She teaches 
criminal law, criminal procedure and evidence 
Lea Johnston is a University Term Professor at the 
University of Florida Levin College of Law, where she 
teaches criminal law, criminal procedure, and mental 
health law. Her scholarship focuses on the intersection 
of mental health, criminal procedure, and punishment. 
Irving Joyner is Professor of Law at North Carolina 
Central University School of Law where he teaches 
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criminal procedure, race and the law, civil rights and 
criminal law. 
Leonard Kaplan is Emeritus Professor of Law at the 
University of Wisconsin. He is past president of the 
International Academy of Law and Mental Health. 
Leo Katz is Frank Carano Professor of Law at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School. He teaches 
criminal law and has written books and articles about 
the field. 
Lewis R. Katz is John C. Hutchens Professor of Law, 
Case Western Reserve University, where he has taught 
criminal law and procedure for over fifty years.  
Anders Kaye is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs. 
Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Criminal Law 
Fellowship Program at Thomas Jefferson School of 
Law. He has written extensively about criminal 
responsibility and the capacities on which it depends. 
Linda M. Keller is Interim Dean and Professor of Law 
at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, where she has 
taught criminal law for several years. 
Joseph E. Kennedy is Martha Brandis Professor of 
Law at the University of North Carolina School of 
Law. 
J.D. King is Clinical Professor of Law and the Director 
of the Criminal Justice Clinic at Washington and Lee 
University School of Law. He teaches criminal proce-
dure, evidence, and professional responsibility and has 
written extensively about criminal law and procedure, 
including the representation of mentally ill clients 
facing criminal charges 
Andrew King-Ries is Professor of Law at the Alexander 
Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana. 
He teaches criminal law, criminal procedure, and 
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domestic violence and has published on the Montana 
law relating to mental disease or defect. 
Kit Kinports is Professor of Law and Polisher Family 
Distinguished Faculty Scholar at Penn State Law. She 
teaches criminal law and has written extensively in 
that area. 
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier is Professor of Law at City 
University of New York School of Law. He teaches 
courses on criminal law and has written extensively on 
topics that include criminal responsibility, constitu-
tional rights, and the Eighth Amendment. 
Laird Kirkpatrick is Louis Harkey Mayo Research 
Professor at The George Washington University Law 
School. 
Dorie Klein is Professor of Law at St. Mary’s 
University School of Law, where she teaches mental 
health law, criminal law, and evidence. 
Richard Klein is Bruce K. Gould Distinguished 
Professor of Law at Touro Law School. He has been a 
professor of criminal law for 35 years and has written 
extensively on criminal law issues. 
Cecelia Klingele is Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Wisconsin Law School. She teaches 
criminal law and procedure, criminal justice admin-
istration, and sentencing and corrections.  
Issa Kohler-Hausmann is Associate Professor of Law 
and Sociology at Yale University. Her writing and 
research focus on criminal law, sociology of punish-
ment, and parole law.  
Margery Koosed is Professor emeritus at University of 
Akron School of Law where she taught criminal law 
and criminal procedure. 
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Joan H. Krause is Dan K. Moore Distinguished 
Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina – 
Chapel Hill School of Law and Professor (Secondary 
Appointment), Social Medicine, UNC School of Medicine. 
She teaches criminal law and health law. 
Tonya Krause-Phelan is Professor of Law at WMU 
Cooley Law School, where she teaches criminal law, 
criminal procedure, and trial skills. She also co-teaches 
the West Michigan Public Defender Clinic and prior  
to joining the faculty aw WMU Cooley, she was a 
practicing criminal defense attorney. 
Alex Kreit is Professor of Law at Thomas Jefferson 
School of Law. He teaches criminal law and has 
writ;en a criminal law casebook, Criminal Law in 
Focus (Wolters Kluwer forthcoming 2019). 
Susan Kuo is Professor of Law at the University of 
South Carolina School of Law, where she teaches 
criminal law and criminal procedure.  
Christopher Kutz is C. William Maxeiner Distinguished 
Professor of Law at U.C. Berkeley, where he teaches 
and writes on criminal law and criminal responsibility. 
Paul M. Kurtz is Associate Dean and J. Alton Hosch 
Professor Emeritus at the University of Georgia School 
of Law. He is the author of the standard treatise on 
Georgia Criminal Law.  
Máximo Langer is Professor of Law and Faculty 
Director of the Criminal Justice Program at UCLA 
School of Law. He has been a professor at UCLA since 
2003 and teaches criminal law, among other subjects. 
Jennifer Laurin is the Wright C. Morrow Professor of 
Law at the University of Texas School of Law. She 
teaches and has written extensively in the fields of 
criminal law and criminal procedure. 
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Tamara Rice Lave is Professor of Law at the 
University of Miami. She teaches and writes in the 
areas of criminal law, criminal procedure, evidence, 
and mental health. 
Youngjae Lee is Professor of Law at Fordham 
University School of Law. Lee teaches criminal law 
and criminal procedure and has written extensively 
about criminal culpability. 
Laurie L. Levenson is David W. Burcham Chair in 
Ethical Advocacy at Loyola Law School Los Angeles. A 
former Assistant United States Attorney who dealt 
with insanity defense cases, she writes extensively in 
criminal law. 
Kate Levine is Assistant Professor of Law at St. John’s 
University School of Law. She teaches criminal law 
and criminal procedure. 
Martin L. Levine is UPS Foundation Chair in Law and 
Gerontology and Professor of Psychiatry and the 
Behavioral Sciences at the University of Southern 
California. He is a past Chair of the Law and 
Psychiatry Section of the Association of American Law 
Schools. 
Rory K. Little is Joseph W. Cotchett Professor of Law 
at U.C. Hastings College of the Law. He teaches 
criminal law, criminal procedure, and constitutional 
law. 
Paul Litton is the Associate Dean for Research and 
R.B. Price Professor of Law at the University of 
Missouri School of Law. He teaches criminal law and 
mental health law, and focuses his research on 
criminal responsibility. 
Ken Levy is the Holt B. Harrison Professor of Law at 
LSU Law School. He writes in criminal theory and 
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teaches criminal law, advanced criminal law, interna-
tional criminal law, and white collar criminal law. 
Shaundra Kellam Lewis is a Professor of Law at 
Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern 
University and a former federal and state Assistant 
Public Defender. She currently teaches criminal law 
and lawyering process. 
Cortney E. Lollar is James & Mary Lassiter Associate 
Professor at the University of Kentucky College of 
Law. She teaches criminal law, criminal procedure, 
and evidence, and her research and scholarly work 
often contemplate the psychological and mental health 
impacts of criminal laws and procedures. 
Gary Lowenthal is Professor Emeritus at the Sandra 
Day O’Connor College of Law of Arizona State University. 
David Luban is University Professor in Law and 
Philosophy at Georgetown University Law Center, and 
Distinguished Chair in Ethics at the Stockdale Center 
for Ethical Leadership, United State Naval Academy. 
His scholarship includes criminal law theory and 
ethics, and he teaches international and transnational 
criminal law. 
Erik Luna is Amelia D. Lewis Professor of 
Constitutional & Criminal Law at the Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University. 
He teaches criminal law and criminal procedure and 
has written extensively on these subjects. 
Paul Marcus is Haynes Professor of Law at the College 
of William and Mary. He teaches and writes in the 
areas of criminal law, criminal procedure and com-
parative law. 
Elizabeth Phillips Marsh is Professor of Law Emerita 
at Quinnipiac University School of Law. 
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Katherine Mattes is Professor of the Practice and 
Director of the Criminal Justice Clinic at Tulane Law 
School and Adjunct Professor in the Forensic 
Psychiatry Department. She is the author of a manual 
for Louisiana lawyers and judges on the insanity 
defense and has taught numerous CLE’s and judicial 
trainings on the insanity defense.  
Sandra G. Mayson is Assistant Professor of Law at 
University of Georgia School of Law. Her scholarship 
explores the distinction between punishment and 
preventive restraint and highlights the role of moral 
culpability as a criterion for punishment. 
Richard H. McAdams is the Bernard D. Meltzer 
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago and has 
taught criminal law for over 25 years. 
Daniel S. McConkie is Associate Professor of Law at 
Northern Illinois University College of Law. He is a 
former Assistant United States Attorney, teaches 
courses in criminal law and procedure and writes 
primarily about criminal procedure. 
Julie McConnell is Clinical Law Professor and 
Director of the Children’s Defense Clinic at the 
University of Richmond School of Law. In addition to 
running the clinic, she teaches juvenile law and 
delinquency procedure, advanced clinical practice, and 
the science of false confessions.  
Kris McDaniel-Miccio is Professor of Law at the 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law. She has 
been a Fulbright Scholar. 
Kevin McMunigal is Professor of Law at Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. He teaches criminal 
law, was formerly an Assistant United States Attorney, 
and is a Contributing Editor to CJ, the ABA Criminal 
Justice Section’s quarterly magazine. 
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Jacqueline McMurtrie is Professor of Law at the 
University of Washington School of Law. She directs 
the Innocence Project Northwest Clinic, and has 
taught and written in the area of criminal law. 
William G. Merkel is Associate Professor of Law at the 
Charleston School of Law. He is an expert on 
constitutional law, the Bill of Rights, and legal theory, 
and he formerly taught at Washburn Law School. 
John Mikhail is Agnes N. Williams Research Professor 
and Associate Dean for Research and Academic 
Programs at Georgetown University Law Center, where 
he teaches constitutional law and criminal law, among 
other subjects. He has written extensively on moral 
psychology, cognitive science, and criminal law. 
Colin Miller is Professor of Law at the University of 
South Carolina School of Law, where he teaches 
evidence and criminal law. 
Eric J. Miller is a professor of law and Leo J. O’Brien 
Fellow at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Professor 
Miller has taught criminal law and has written 
extensively about criminal law and procedure.  
David W Mills is Professor of Practice and Senior 
Lecturer (Continuing Appointment) at Stanford Law 
School. 
Saira Mohamed is Professor of Law at the University 
of California, Berkeley, School of Law. She teaches and 
writes in the area of substantive criminal law. 
John T. Monahan is the John S. Shannon Distinguished 
Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology and Professor 
of Psychiatry and Neurobehavioral Sciences at the 
University of Virginia. He teaches mental health law 
and has written extensively about criminal responsibility. 
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Michael S. Moore is Charles R. Walgreen, Jr. Chair for 
the University of Illinois’ three campuses and is jointly 
appointed as professor of law in the College of Law and 
as a professor with the Center for Advanced Studies. 
He has written extensively on criminal law and mental 
health law, including the defense of legal insanity. 
Stephen J. Morse is the Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell 
Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology and Law 
in Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania and  
he is a board-certified forensic psychologist. He has 
written extensively on the insanity defense and on 
criminal responsibility generally. 
Robert P. Mosteller is J. Dickson Phillips Distinguished 
Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina 
School of Law. He was a practicing criminal defense 
attorney and then taught criminal procedure and 
evidence and Duke and North Carolina. 
Jeffrie G. Murphy is Regents’ Professor of Law, 
Philosophy and Religious Studies at the Sandra Day 
O’Connor School of Law, Arizona State University. He 
has written extensively about the philosophy of crime 
and punishment and responsibility. 
Dr Dora Nevares-Muniz is Distinguished Professor of 
Law at the Inter American University of Puerto Rico. 
She teaches criminal law, criminal procedure, juvenile 
justice, criminology, and biolaw, and is the author of 
various books on criminal law and chief drafter of the 
Puerto Rico Penal Code of 2004.  
Samuel P. Newton is Assistant Professor of Law at the 
University of Idaho. He teaches criminal procedure 
and evidence and has published articles related to 
criminal law. 
Kenneth B. Nunn is Professor of Law, Associate 
Director Criminal Justice Center, and Assistant 
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Director of the Center on Children and Families at the 
University of Florida Levin College of Law. He teaches 
criminal law and procedure and writes about criminal 
law reform and racial justice. 
Sean D. O’Brien is Professor of Law at the University 
of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. He teaches 
criminal law and mental health law and has written 
articles and book chapters on standards for conducting 
forensic mental health investigations and assessments. 
Anne Olesen is Professor of Clinical Law at the George 
Washington University Law School and directs the 
Criminal Appeals and Post-Conviction Services Clinic. 
She previously worked in the Civil Rights Division of 
the Department of Justice where she litigated cases 
enforcing the right to mental health treatment in 
prisons and jails.  
Jennifer Oliva is Associate Professor of Law and 
member of the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical 
Law & Policy at the Seton Hall University School of 
Law. She teaches health law and evidence courses, 
including neuroscience and the law. 
William Wesley Patton, a psychiatrist, is Lecturer in 
Law at the University of Southern California Gould 
School of Law and at the UCLA David Geffen School 
of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry. For more than 
30 years, he has taught and published articles on 
criminal responsibility and on the psychological effects 
of the legal system on those charged with criminal 
offenses. 
Gary Peller is Professor of Law at Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
Michael L. Perlin is Professor Emeritus of Law at New 
York Law School, where he taught criminal law, 
criminal procedure, and multiple mental disability law 
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courses. He writes extensively about the insanity 
defense and all aspects of criminal law and procedure 
as it affects persons with serious mental disabilities. 
LeRoy Pernell is past Dean and Professor of Law at 
Florida A. & M. University College of Law. He has 
taught, written, and advocated law reform extensively 
in the area of criminal procedure and mental health 
Samuel H. Pillsbury is Professor of Law and Frederick 
J. Lower Fellow at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 
where he teaches courses in criminal law and criminal 
responsibility relating to mental disorders. He also 
works as a chaplain in the Twin Towers Correctional 
Facility in Los Angeles which is the largest provider of 
in-patient mental health services in the West. 
Ellen S. Podgor is Gary R. Trombley Family White-
Collar Crime Research Professor of Law at Stetson 
University College of Law. She teaches criminal law, 
criminal procedure - adjudication, and white collar 
criminal law.  
Daniel D. Polsby is past dean and Professor of Law at 
George Mason University and was the Kirkland & 
Ellis Professor of Law at Northwestern University. He 
teaches criminal law. 
Robert A Pugsley is Emeritus Professor of Criminal 
Law at Southwestern Law School. 
Amanda C. Pustilnik is Professor of Law at the 
University of Maryland School of Law and a program 
director of the Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior at 
Massachusetts General Hospital. She was the first 
fellow in Law & Applied Neuroscience at Harvard Law 
School and has written extensively on the legal 
relevance of cognitive neuroscience.  
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Intisar Rabb is Professor of Law at Harvard Law 
School. He teaches and writes about criminal law. 
Gerald S. Reamey is Professor of Law at St. Mary’s 
University School of Law, where he has taught 
criminal law and constitutional criminal procedure for 
thirty-seven years. He has published several books 
and numerous law review and journal articles on the 
subject of criminal responsibility. 
Richard E. Redding is the Ronald D. Rotunda 
Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence at the 
Fowler School of Law at Chapman University and 
Professor of Psychology and Education at Chapman 
University. He teaches criminal law and mental 
health law and has written extensively about forensic 
mental health issues, including the insanity defense. 
Charles J. Reid, Jr. is Professor of Law at the 
University of St. Thomas. He teaches criminal law and 
jurisprudence. 
Judith Resnik is Arthur Liman Professor of Law at 
Yale Law School, where she teaches criminal justice. 
L. Song Richardson is Dean and Chancellor’s Professor 
of Law at UC Irvine School of Law. Her areas of 
expertise include criminal law and criminal procedure. 
Judith L. Ritter is Distinguished Professor of Law, 
Director of the Taishoff Advocacy, Technology, and 
Public Service Institute, and Director of the Widener 
Criminal Defense Clinic at Widener University 
Delaware Law School. She teaches criminal law. 
Ira P. Robbins is Barnard T. Welsh Scholar and 
Professor of Law at American University, Washington 
College of Law. He has taught criminal law for more 
than forty years and has written extensively about 
mens rea and related issues. 
31a 
Kalyani Robbins is a Professor of Law at Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law. Professor Robbins 
is a former ADA for New York County and teaches and 
writes about criminal law. 
Anna Roberts is Professor of Law at St. John’s 
University School of Law, where she teaches criminal 
law and evidence. 
Dorothy E. Roberts is George A. Weiss University 
Professor of Law & Sociology and Raymond Pace & 
Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander Professor of Civil 
Rights at the University of Pennsylvania. She has 
taught and written extensively in criminal law and 
related fields for thirty-one years. 
Paul H. Robinson is Colin S. Diver Professor of Law at 
the University of Pennsylvania. He teaches criminal 
law and has written numerous books, including a 
casebook and treatise, and articles on criminal law. 
Addie C. Rolnick is a Professor of Law at the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd 
School of Law. She teaches criminal law.  
Charles H. Rose, a retired Army Judge Advocate, is 
Professor of Law at Stetson University and the 
incoming Dean of the Ohio Northern University 
Wayne W. Pettit School of Law. He teaches and writes 
in the areas of criminal procedure, evidence and trial 
advocacy, and has published numerous articles and 
texts in these areas. 
Leslie Rose is Professor Emerita at Golden Gate, 
where she continues to teach criminal procedure. She 
was a staff attorney at the Office of the California 
State Public Defender, which handled complex criminal 
appeals, death penalty, and habeas corpus cases.  
32a 
Clifford Rosky is Professor of Law at the University of 
Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, where he teaches 
criminal law.  
Jacqueline E. Ross is Prentice H. Marshall Professor 
of Law and Director of the Program in Comparative 
Criminal Procedure and Policing at the University of 
Illinois College of Law. She teaches criminal Law, with 
coverage of mental health issues, and writes about 
criminal responsibility. 
Paul Rothstein is Professor of Law at Georgetown.  
He has taught criminal law, was Advisor to both 
Senate and House subcommittees of their Judiciary 
Committees attempting recodification of the entire 
Federal Criminal Code, and has written extensively 
about culpability and the defenses. 
Susan D. Rozelle is Professor of Law at Stetson 
University College of Law. She teaches criminal law, 
evidence, criminal procedure: adjudication, and a 
seminar in criminal responsibility and has written 
extensively about the insanity defense and related 
issues. 
David Rudovsky is Senior Fellow at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. He teaches and writes in 
criminal law and procedure and has extensive practice 
experience in those areas. 
Howard M. Rubin is Professor of Law Emeritus at 
DePaul College of Law. He taught professional 
responsibility, directed the DePaul Legal Clinic for 
over 30 years, taught the Criminal Appeals Clinic, and 
was Associate Dean for the Lawyering Skills courses.  
Elyn R. Saks is Orrin B. Evans Distinguished 
Professor of Law, Psychology, and Psychiatry and the 
Behavioral Sciences at the University of Southern 
California Gould School of Law as well as Faculty 
33a 
Director of the USC Saks Institute for Mental Health 
Law, Policy, and Ethics. She writes extensively in the 
area of law and mental health, having published over 
50 articles and five books. 
Lupe S. Salinas is Professor of Law at Texas Southern 
University Thurgood Marshall Law School. He is a 
retired criminal court judge and now teaches criminal 
law and procedure. 
Alan Saltzman is retired Professor of Law. He taught 
criminal law at the University of Oklahoma, the 
University of Nebraska and The University of Detroit 
Mercy. 
Barry C. Scheck is Professor of Law and Co-Founder 
of the Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law. He has taught and practiced criminal 
law, including involvement in insanity and related 
diminished capacity cases. 
Albert E. Scherr is Professor of Law and Chair of the 
International Criminal Law & Justice Program at the 
University of New Hampshire School of Law. He 
teaches constitutional criminal procedure and evidence. 
Susan R. Schmeiser is Professor of Law at the 
University of Connecticut School of Law. She teaches 
criminal law, mental health law and family law, and 
her scholarship addresses intersections between law 
and the mental health professions.  
Robert F. Schopp is Robert J. Kutak Professor of Law, 
Professor of Psychology, and Professor of Philosophy at 
the University of Nebraska. His work focuses on the 
significance of psychological impairment for the 
justification of various forms of criminal and civil 
interventions into ordinarily protected liberties. 
34a 
Stephen J. Schulhofer is Robert B. McKay Professor of 
Law at New York University. He has taught criminal 
law for more than forty-five years, written extensively 
on criminal law and procedure, and is the co-author if 
one of the nation’s leading casebooks on criminal law. 
Judith A.M. Scully is Professor of Law at Stetson 
University College of Law and is Co-Director of the 
Social Justice Advocacy Concentration Program. She 
teaches and writes in the areas of criminal and 
juvenile law, with special emphasis on issues of race. 
Elisabeth Semel is Clinical Professor of Law at UC 
Berkeley School of Law where she is the founding 
Director of the Death Penalty Clinic. In that capacity 
and before joining the faculty, she has been engaged 
extensively in issues involving criminal and mental 
health law. 
Steven Semeraro is Professor of Law at Thomas 
Jefferson School of Law. He has practiced, taught and 
written about criminal law and procedure for over 30 
years. 
Bijal Shah is Associate Professor of Law at Arizona 
State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of 
Law. He teaches criminal law, and has both litigated 
and written policy on criminal matters as they concern 
immigration. 
Laurie Shanks is Clinical Professor of Law Emerita at 
Albany Law Schoo. She has been a criminal defense 
attorney for 40 years. 
James Shellenberger is Professor of Law at Temple 
University Beasley School of law, where he has taught 
several criminal law and criminal procedure courses 
for 35 years. Before joining the Temple faculty, he was, 
among other things, an Assistant District Attorney in 
Philadelphia and Chief Staff Counsel for the 
35a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Criminal Procedural 
Rules Committee. 
Karl Shoemaker is Professor of History and Law at the 
University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has taught the 
history of criminal law for 17 years. 
Dawinder S. Sidhu is visiting professor at the 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of 
Law. He teaches and writes in the areas of criminal 
law and criminal sentencing and founded a facility 
that serves individuals suffering from addiction and 
co-occurring mental health disorders. 
David M. Siegel is Professor of Law and Director, 
Center for Law and Social Responsibility at New 
England Law School. He teaches criminal law and 
procedure and has written extensively on mental 
health issues in the criminal process. 
Jonathan S. Simon is Adrian A. Kragen Professor of 
Law and Director of the Center for the Study of Law 
and Society at the University of California Berkeley. 
He teaches classes on criminal law and punishment, 
has co-taught a mental health and criminal justice 
reform seminar and has published extensively on 
punishment in contemporary society. 
Kenneth W. Simons is Chancellor’s Professor of Law 
and Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine 
School of Law. He teaches criminal law, has taught 
seminars on crime and punishment, and has written 
extensively about criminal law culpability and 
responsibility. 
Eric S. Sirulnik is Professor of Law Emeritus of the 
George Washington University School of Law, where 
he taught criminal law, criminal procedure, the 
administration of criminal justice, drugs and the law, 
and trial advocacy. He also served as Director of the 
36a 
Community Legal Clinics and Associate Dean for 
Clinical Affairs. 
Christopher Slobogin is the Milton Underwood 
Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University. He is  
the lead author of the leading casebook in mental 
health law and writes extensively about criminal law, 
criminal procedure and mental health law. 
Abbe Smith is Professor of Law, Director of the 
Criminal Defense & Prisoner Advocacy Clinic, and Co-
Director of the E. Barrett Prettyman Fellowship 
Program at Georgetown University. She teaches 
criminal law and procedure and legal ethics.  
Stephen F. Smith is Professor of Law at the University 
of Notre Dame. He teaches criminal law and procedure 
and has written extensively about the need to limit 
punishment in accordance with offenders’ moral 
blameworthiness. 
Matthew Steffey is Professor of Law at Mississippi 
College School of Law. He teaches criminal law and 
constitutional law and has recently written on 
criminal procedure.  
John A. Strait is Emeritus Professor of Law and 
Professional Ethics Counsel at Seattle University 
School of Law. 
Carol Steiker is Professor of Law at Harvard Law 
School. She teaches criminal law, criminal procedure, 
and capital punishment law, and has written exten-
sively in the broad field of criminal justice. 
Jordan Steiker is the Judge Robert Parker Chair and 
Director of the Capital Punishment Center at the 
University of Texas School of Law.  
37a 
Kate Stith is Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law at 
Yale Law School. She teaches and writes about 
criminal law. 
Donald H. Stone is Professor of Law and Director of 
the Mental Health Law Clinic at the University of 
Baltimore School of Law. 
Irwin P. Stotzky is Professor of Law at the University 
of Miami School of Law. 
John Kelly Strader is Professor of Law at Southwestern 
Law School. He teaches and writes principally in the 
area of criminal law. 
Mark A. Summers is Professor of Law at Barry 
University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law. He 
teaches criminal law, criminal procedure and evidence.  
Ellen Y. Suni is Dean Emerita and Professor of Law at 
University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. She 
has taught criminal law for more than 25 years. 
Kim Taylor-Thompson is Professor of Clinical Law at 
New York University School of Law. She teaches crim-
inal law and has written about criminal responsibility. 
John Teeter is Professor of law at St. Mary’s 
University School of Law and has been teaching 
criminal law for more than thirty years. 
Edward H. Telfeyan is Professor of Lawyering Skills 
at the McGeorge School of Law University of the 
Pacific. He teaches criminal law defenses and was 
formerly a criminal defense attorney. 
Joseph Thai is the Watson Centennial Chair in Law at 
the University of Oklahoma College of Law 
Peter N. Thompson is Emeritus Professor of Law at 
Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
38a 
Rachel Van Cleave is Professor of Law and Former 
Dean at Golden Gate University, School of Law. She 
teaches constitutional law, criminal procedure and 
comparative criminal justice and is a two-time US 
Fulbright Scholar awardee: in 1996 at the Italian 
Constitutional Court and in 2020 at the Corte 
Suprema di Cassazione, Rome. 
Michael Vitiello is Professor of Law at McGeorge School 
of Law. He writes extensively about criminal law. 
Cynthia V. Ward is Professor of Law at William and 
Mary Law School, where she teaches and writes in 
criminal law and psychology & law. 
D. Kelly Weisberg is Professor of Law at Hastings 
College of the Law, University of California. She 
teaches domestic violence law and juvenile justice., 
and writes extensively on domestic violence law. 
Charles D. Weisselberg is the Shannon C. Turner 
Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, 
School of Law. Weisselberg teaches criminal law and 
criminal procedure, and previously practiced mental 
health law. 
Lois A. Weithorn is a Professor of Law and Harry & 
Lillian Hastings Research Chair at University of 
California Hastings College of the Law. She teaches 
criminal law and mental health law. 
Peter K. Westen is Frank C. Millard Professor of Law 
Emeritus at the University of Michigan. He has 
written extensively about criminal law and criminal 
law theory. 
David B Wexler is Professor of Law at the University 
of Puerto Rico and Distinguished Research Professor 
of Law Emeritus at the University of Arizona. He has 
taught and written about criminal law and mental 
39a 
health law and now focuses on those areas through his 
work in therapeutic jurisprudence.  
James Q Whitman is Ford Foundation Professor of 
Comparative and Foreign Law at Yale University. He 
has written extensively about criminal law, including 
numerous books and articles. 
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., is Professor of Law Emeritus, 
University of Georgia School of Law, where he taught 
criminal procedure for 37 years and criminal law for 
20 years. 
Pamela A. Wilkins is Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. She teaches 
criminal law and some of her scholarship has focused 
on mental illness and the death penalty. 
Kenneth Williams is Professor of Law at South Texas 
College of Law. He teaches criminal law and procedure 
and evidence, and has written a book and numerous 
law review articles on issues related to capital 
punishment and the mental health issues related to 
capital punishment. 
Jonathan Witmer-Rich is Joseph C. Hostetler—Baker 
Hostetler Professor of Law at Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law, Cleveland State University. He 
teaches criminal law and criminal procedure and has 
published on blameworthiness in the criminal law. 
Steven Zeidman is Professor of Law at CUNY School 
of Law, where he teaches Criminal Procedure and 
directs a Criminal Defense Clinic. His scholarly inter-
ests include the constitutional and ethical dimensions 
of assistance of counsel.  
 
 
40a 
Adnan A. Zulfiqar is an Assistant Professor of Law at 
Rutgers Law School where his research and teaching 
focus on criminal law and procedure. He has helped 
draft and implement multiple criminal codes, each 
including an insanity defense. 
